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In the summer of 2005, the 100,000 members of the Hong Kong
Boy Scouts Association were engaged in their regular camping,
cooking and hiking activities. As with scouts the world over, they
were eager to earn merit badges memorializing various levels of knottying and fire-building abilities. However, these scouts also worked
for a merit badge that was the first of its kind in any country-an
"IPR Badge" awarded for participation in an educational course on
intellectual property rights and the wrongs of film piracy.' The badge
was sponsored in part by Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy
(STOP!), an organization backed by the U.S. Department of Justice,
the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), and the Hong
Kong Intellectual Property Department, to "counter cultural thinking
'2
on piracy."
Such is the new face of the war against film piracy in the
People's Republic of China (PRC). A world away from the World
Trade Organization's (WTO) contentious roundtables in Switzerland,
the seeds of a cooperative effort between U.S. and Chinese forces are
taking root in a classroom. 3 This is a novel reaction to the present
movie piracy crisis that costs the U.S. motion picture industry $5.4
billion worldwide and $2.1 billion a year in China alone. 4 Every day in
China, illegal factories churn out copies of American Digital Versatile
Discs (DVDs) or videocassettes, and if one buys an American film in
China today, there is a ninety three percent chance that it is pirated. 5

1.
Douglas Crets, Scouts Unveil Anti-Piracy Badge, STANDARD (Hong Kong), May
4, 2005, availableat http://www.thestandard.com.hk/stdn/stdfMetro/GE04Ak06.html.
2.
Hong Kong Boys Scout Out Piracy Badges, Bus. REP. (S. Afr.), May 4, 2005,
availableat http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=553&fArticleId=2506716.
3.
See Crets, supra note 1.
4.

MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, WORLDWIDE STUDY OF LOSSES TO

THE FILM INDUSTRY AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES DUE TO PIRACY; PIRATE PROFILES

available
(2006),
2006 05 031eksumm.pdf
WORLDWIDE STUDY].

5.

Id.

http://www.fact-uk.org.uklsite/media-centre/documents/
at
[hereinafter MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
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Additionally, China has commenced exporting these movies to other
countries, thus increasing the alarming financial loss to the American
motion picture industry.
This crisis persists even though China presently has a robust
set of copyright laws and substantial international treaty obligations
intended to combat piracy. 6 Upon liberalizing its economic policies
after the Cultural Revolution, China strove to join the WTO, but the
United States threatened to oppose China's membership unless it
caught up to global standards for intellectual property protection. 7
Keen on harnessing China's enormous trading potential, the United
States was instrumental in helping China craft its body of copyright
laws. 8
When China subsequently failed to enforce these laws,
however, this auspicious beginning degenerated into a series of trade
sanctions. 9 Using threats of trade sanctions as its proverbial stick, the
United States compelled China to enter into a number of agreements
requiring progressively greater protections against piracy and
increasing levels of enforcement of its copyright laws.' 0 By the time
China finally joined the WTO in 2001, it was a party to a collection of
watershed agreements designed to orchestrate a veritable crackdown

6.
Brent T. Yonehara, Comment, Enter the Dragon: China's WTO Accession, Film
Piracy and Prospects for the Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 389, 390
(2002).
7.
Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual
Property Disputes: What We Can Learn From Mediators, Business Strategists, and
InternationalRelations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 641 (2002); see also Peter K. Yu,
The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China, 11 OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN
INTELL. PROP.FROM BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW 1, 30 (2002), available at

http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/news-events/papers/lI.pdf (indicating that "it would not be too
far-fetched to argue that China might still remain outside the WTO had it not
strengthened its protection of intellectual property rights"); Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical
Assessment of the U.S-China Conflict on Intellectual Property,6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295,
298 (1996) (noting that the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) became a treaty obligation of WTO members).
8.
See Yu, supra note 7, at 8-9.
9.
Id. at 13.
10.
See Eric Priest, The Future of Music and Film Piracy in China, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 795, 809 (2006); see also KENT HUGHES, GANG LIN & JENNIFER TURNER, CHINA
AND THE WTO: DOMESTIC CHALLENGES AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES 6 (2002),

available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubsIWTOrpt.pdf (stating that China's
joining the WTO signified "[b]road Chinese acceptance of WTO standards on . . .
intellectual property" and noting that China's quest to join the WTO began in 1986, when
China first expressed an interest in joining GATT); id. at 9 ("Chinese accession [to the
WTO] also means that it will be required to abide by existing WTO codes on intellectual
property..."); World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, Intellectual Property:
Protection
and
Enforcement,
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatise/tif_e/
agrm7_e.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
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on piracy in China."
Yet, piracy of American movies in China has
persisted throughout this process and is on the rise today.

The problem is not that China lacks copyright laws, but that it
lacks the will and the legal structures to enforce them. 12 Several
factors account for this. The first is culture. Two thousand years of
Confucian influence have produced a society that values Li (a "moral
code") over Fa ("positive law"), and is consequently unprepared for the
sudden imposition of Western-style rule of law. 13 In addition, Chinese
tradition favors, even encourages, copying and imitation over
creativity and innovation, making the concept of "piracy" difficult to
digest.' 4

Second, Chinese political ideology is vastly different from

that of the United States. China's information control policy, aimed at
keeping out Western films that espouse ideals that are anathemas to
the PRC, has had the unintended effect of spawning a black market
for pirated versions of these works. 15 Furthermore, the PRC's political

system is built on a concept of collectivity that is contrary to the
notion of generating profit for oneself through one's artistic work-a
notion which does not square well with the economic incentive model
of U.S. copyright law. 16

Third, China's judiciary is only a couple of

decades out of its near atrophy during the Cultural Revolution and
suffers from a dearth of lawyers, judges, and general familiarity with

the new copyright laws. 17 In addition, the judiciary is severely
crippled by a lack of both transparency and independence from other
political branches.' 8 Fourth, China lacks the administrative

11.
12.

Priest, supra note 10, at 809-10.
Yonehara, supra note 6, at 391-92.

13.
SHAO-CHUAN LENG, JUSTICE IN COMMUNIST CHINA: A SURVEY OF THE JUDICIAL
SYSTEM OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC xiii (1967).

14.
Susan Tiefenbrum, A Hermeneutic Methodology and How Pirates Read and
Misread the Berne Convention, 17 WISC. INT'L L.J. 1, 11 (1999).
15.
Laikwan Pang, Piracy/Privacy: The Despair of Cinema and Collectivity in
China, 31 BOUNDARY 2 102, 110 (Fall 2004).
16.
See Yu, supra note 7, at 8.
17.
See Charles Baum, Trade Sanctions and the Rule of Law: Lessons from China, 1
STAN. J. EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS 46, 49 (2001), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/
sjeaa/journall/china4.pdf; see also Qizhi Luo, Autonomy, Qualificationand Professionalism
of the PRC Bar, 12 COLUM. 'J. OF ASIAN L. 1, 8-9 (1998), available at
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/asiaweb/vl2nlLuo.htm (describing the
absence of lawyers
from the Chinese social and political scene under Mao, when lawyers were seen as
"undesirables because of their role in defending alleged criminals and counterrevolutionaries against the state").
18.
M. Ulric Killion, Post-WTO China and Independent Judicial Review, 26 HOUST.
J. INT'L L. 507, 509-10 (2004) (noting that the implementation of the.rule of law and the
need to reform the Chinese legal system is a necessity which even China recognizes); see
also THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN HONG KONG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
COMMITTEE, CHALLENGES IN PROTECTING IP RIGHTS THROUGH CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE
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mechanisms to enforce its laws. National plans to combat piracy fall
prey to local protectionism when instituted at the ground level, as
local officials thwart efforts to sanction or shut down illegal businesses
that generate profits for the community.
This note examines the current state of China's intellectual
property rights protection as it relates to movie piracy. Part I
examines the different types of film piracy occurring in China and the
current severity of the problem for the United States motion picture
industry. Part II traces the history of copyright law in China and
examines China's commitments under the international copyright
treaties it has signed with the United States and other nations
through its recent accession to the WTO. Part III discusses why movie
piracy in China is still on the rise despite these commitments and
highlights why cultural, ideological, judicial and administrative
problems impede their enforcement. Part IV argues that pressure
tactics in the form of U.S. trade sanctions against China are
ineffective to combat these problems and proposes solutions that can
operate effectively from within China, obviating the need for outside
pressure.
I. THE NATURE OF FILM PIRACY
As developers vie to build plush new movie theaters in China's
booming cities, a class of film viewers is growing that has no intention
of ever entering a cinema. 19 China already has the greatest number of
movie theaters in the world at 65,000.20 However, "[e]ven in relatively
wealthy Beijing, a movie ticket is a luxury beyond the reach of most of
the capital's 15 million residents, who earned on average 15,700 yuan
($1,900) [in 2004]."21 "China's national average price for a movie
ticket is about 20 yuan ($2.40). In big cities tickets can run as high as

PRC

(Oct.

31,

2002),

http://www.amcham.org.hk/pr/positionpapers/civilLigitg

ationinIPCases.pdf [hereinafter AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE]; UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT: RESULTS OF OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW
ON CHINA (2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/

2005/2005_Special_301/asset upload file835_7647.pdf [hereinafter USTR OUT-OF-CYCLE
REVIEW].
19.
Survey: Foreign Investment and China's Media Market, in CHINA IT &
TELECOM REPORT, Dec. 24, 2004, available at Interfax News Agency database on LEXIS.
20.
Gloria Goodale, Oscar's Elegant Home - In a Shopping Mall, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Boston), Mar. 22, 2002, at 13. Compare this to the U.S., which with 37,185 has
the second highest number of movie theaters. Id.
21.
Jonathan Landreth, China: U.S. Companies Confident Patience Will Pay Off,
HOLLYWOODREPORTER.COM, Jul. 19, 2005, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/
articledisplay.jsp?vnucontentid-1000980879.
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80 yuan ($9.60)."22 Clearly, when the same movie is available for 8
yuan ($0.96) on a pirated DVD, the cost calculus easily favors the
DVD over the movie theater. 23 Moreover, means of illegally accessing
24
movies at even cheaper prices continue to flourish in China.
A. Types of Film Piracy
Pirate optical disks, which include Laser Discs, Video Compact
Discs (VCDs) and DVDs are inexpensive to manufacture and easy to
distribute, 25 making them an obvious choice for piracy in China.
Optical discs are of a much better quality than those produced by the
less sophisticated mechanism of analog piracy and unwitting users are
unlikely to even recognize the disc as a counterfeit. 26 The threat of
optical disc piracy is demonstrably severe; in 2001 it was cited as the
reason an entire Hong Kong movie theatre chain went out of
business. 27 The danger is aggravated by the ease of production of
illegal optical discs-pirates with the right CD pressing equipment
28
can produce thousands of perfect VCDs or DVDs daily.
Internet piracy is another major means of distributing films in
violation of copyright laws. 29 It is a natural draw in China, where 103
million people were online in 2004, making the PRC the second
biggest user of internet facilities in the world following the United
30
States.
Internet Piracy is the downloading or distribution of unauthorized copies of works
such as movies, television and music via the Internet .... [Illiegal downloads occur
in many forms, including file sharing networks, pirate servers . . . and hacked
31
computers. Each file posted on the internet can result in millions of downloads.

22.
Id.
23.
Survey: Foreign Investment and China's Media Market, supra note 19.
24.
See INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT:
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 188 (2005), available at http://www.iipa.comrbc/2005/
2005SPEC301PRCrev.pdf. For example, the average cost of a pirate VCD is $0.60 to $1.20.
Id.
25.
Yonehara, supra note 6, at 393.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Mary Catherine O'Connor, Group Studies RFID to Stop DigitalPiracy,RFID J.,
May 12, 2005, http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1589.
29.
Yonehara, supra note 6, at 393.
30.
Enrique de Argaez, Internet World Stats, China Ends 2004 with 103 Million
Internet Users, http://www.internetworldstats.com/articles/art045.htm (last visited Jan.
17, 2007).

31.
Motion Picture Association of America, Internet Piracy, http://www.mpaa.org/
piracy-internet.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 2007).
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Today, internet piracy in China is growing rapidly. 32
Videocassette piracy is the "illegal duplication, distribution,
33
rental or sale of copyrighted videocassettes" with various devices.
Often, a pirate will simply use a hand-held video camera to record a
theatre screen and then copy the film onto blank videocassettes for
34
illegal distribution.
Theatrical print theft involves the theft of a 35 or 16mm film
print from a theater, studio, or other industry-related facility. 35 This
"allows the pirate to make a relatively high quality videotape from the
theatrical print, which then serves as the master" from which
36
duplicates can be made.
Piracy can also take place over the air waves. 37 Broadcast
piracy involves the illegal on-air broadcasting of a film without
permission from the copyright holder. 38 The film itself is usually a
bootleg. 39 This problem is "mostly unchecked in Chinese hotels, clubs,
mini-theatres and even government facilities." 40 Equally problematic
is the practice of illegally viewing movies by tapping into television
41
cable systems and stealing satellite signals without authorization.
B. Current Severity of the Piracy Problem in China
In 2005, the U.S. motion picture industry lost an estimated
$2.1 billion due to copyright piracy in China, the nation with the worst
piracy record in the world. 42 Industry estimates suggest that 93
43
percent of the potential market in China is "lost due to piracy."
Statistics on the number of DVDs that have been seized in China help
to illustrate the enormity of the problem, and the fact that it is
escalating. In 2003, the National Anti-Piracy and Pornography
Working Committee (NAPPWC) seized 64 million pirated optical discs
in China. 44 In 2004, the number of discs seized by the NAPPWC was

32.

INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, supra note 24, at 189.

33.

Motion Picture Association of America, Other Piracy, http://www.mpaa.org/

piracy-other.asp (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, supra note 24, at 189.
Motion Picture Association of America, Other Piracy, supra note 33.

42.

MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 4.

43.
44.

Id.
INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, supra note 24, at 187.
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up to 165 million. 45 At the same time, Chinese customs officials
claimed to have seized a further 79.6 million optical discs. "In 2004
there were reportedly 83 licensed plants in China, with 765 operating
production lines." 46 This was "up from 71 plants and 569 lines
reported in 2003." 47
Former President of the Motion Pictures
Association of America (MPAA), Jack Valenti, indicated in June 2004
that piracy in China has reached a level "not seen since 1995 when it
48
was 100 percent."
Not only is piracy rampant in China, but the illegal DVDs
distributed there are now being exported to other countries in the
region, which will naturally exacerbate damage to the U.S. film
industry. 49 In 2004, Jack Valenti noted that China was "once again
becoming a source of pirate discs circulating in world markets." 50 The
NAPPCW echoed this dire message, indicating that China is emerging
as a major world exporter to the United States, the United Kingdom
and other countries.5 1 For example, the number of pirated discs from
China seized by United Kingdom customs officials in 2004 totaled
78,666, "compared with 1,238 pirated discs seized in the same period
52
[in] 2003 (a rapid increase of 6,254 percent)."
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CURRENT CHINESE COPYRIGHT LAW AND
COPYRIGHT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

In order to appreciate the challenges involved in fighting film
piracy in China, it is important to understand the country's current
body of copyright law, as well as the difficult tug-of-war between the
United States and China that led to its creation. Historically, China
and the United States have had radically different degrees of
copyright protection. 53 From its founding, the United States codified

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.
Evaluating International Intellectual Property Piracy: Hearing Before the S.
Cmm. On Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement of Jack Valenti, President &
CEO, Motion Picture Association of America), available at http://www.senate.gov/
-foreigntestimony/2004/ValentiTestimonyO4O6O9.pdf.
49.
See id. at 2.
50.
Id. at 5.
51.

INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, supra note 24, at 188-89.

52.
Testimony Before the S. Comm.. on Foreign Relations (2004) (statement of Jack
Valenti, President & CEO, Motion Picture Association of America), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/testimony/2004ValentiTestimonyO40609.pdf.
53.
Kristie M. Kachuriak, Chinese Copyright Priracy:Analysis of the Problem and
Suggestions for Protectionof U.S. Copyrights, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 599, 601 (1995).
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into law the protection of literary and artistic work, whereas China's
copyright law only dates back to the 1970s.5 4 At this time, the new
generation of Chinese leaders who sought to open China economically
understood that intellectual property laws were a prerequisite to
attracting foreign investment and establishing good standing among
the major players in the world economy. 55 Apparently reconciled to
playing by a new set of rules, the Chinese joined a number of
international copyright agreements and bilateral treaties with the
United States, but its endeavor to match world standards in
intellectual property rights enforcement has been marked by serious
growing pains.
A. A Brief History of Copyright Law in the United States and China
In the United States, the protection of one's ideas was
recognized as a fundamental right and was included in the
Constitution over 200 years ago. 5 6 Article I, Section 8 gives Congress
the power "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.' 57 Between 1790
and the 1960s, more than three million patents and ten million
copyrights were issued under the authority of this constitutional
clause. 58 By 2006, the United States Patent Office was issuing an
average of 476 patents a day, "propelled" by growth in the electronics
industry. 59 Such large scale distribution of copyrights and patents is
in line with two basic tenets of U.S. intellectual property law: "(1) that
the products of original and creative thought confer benefit upon
society, and (2) that such creative thought is stimulated to greater
activity when offered governmental protection of rights in its products
as an incentive." 60 Today, the United States continues to benefit from
a sophisticated body of copyright law that grants authors exclusive
rights to reproduce, prepare, distribute, perform and display their
61
works, or to authorize others to do so.
54.
55.

56.
57.
58.
(1967).

Id. at 601-02.
Priest, supra note 10, at 805.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id.
BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 2

59.
Posting of Emil Protalinsk to Neowin.net, U.S. Issues Record Number of
Patents in 2006, http://www.neowin.net/index.php?act--view&id=37141 (Jan. 13, 2007,
02:51).
60.
BUGBEE, supra note 58, at 9.
61.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
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By contrast, China's copyright law only came into existence 30
years ago, cultivated in an ideological environment opposing
ownership of ideas.62 During the Cultural Revolution, individual
artistic expression not only was ascribed no value, but also was only
permitted to the extent that it embodied state ideology. 63 When China
adopted a socialist system, "authors were salaried employees of the
of
State [with] no incentive to produce" and "could have no expectation '64
receiving [ . . ] remuneration for the republication of their works.
Today, however, copyright protection "has taken on new importance"
as authors depend on their creations, rather than the State, for their
income 65 and as foreign investment in China is tagged increasingly to
66
effective copyright protection.
B. Modern Copyright Law in China and U.S.-China Treaties
1. The Creation of Chinese Copyright Law
China forged its first copyright agreement with the United
States in 1979.67 The U.S.-China Trade Agreement called for each
nation to offer copyright, patent and trademark protection
"equivalent" to the "protection correspondingly accorded by the
other."68 "Pursuant to this agreement, China became a member of the
69
...
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1980.
However, despite strong international pressure, most notably from the
United States, the enactment of a formal copyright law was delayed
because of infighting among the drafters stemming from ideological
70
differences over the meaning of copyright in China.
In 1990 the PRC finally created a copyright law that explicitly
protects the copyright and other legitimate rights and interests of the
authors of literary, artistic and scientific works, including the

62.
See LAURENCE J. BRAHM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
IN CHINA 103-04 (2d ed. 1994).

63.

Id, at 103.

64.
65.

Id, at 104.
Id.

66.

Priest, supra note 10, at 805.

67.
68.

Id. at 806.
Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the

People's Republic of China art. VI(3), U.S.-P.R.C., July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4651.
69.
Yu, supra note 7, at 8.
70.
Michael N. Schlesinger, Note, A Sleeping Giant Awakens: The Development of
Intellectual Property Law in China, 9 J. CHINESE L. 93, 113 (1995).
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protection of films. 7 1 The law defines acts that are considered
72
"infringement" if done without the copyright owner's permission.
These include: (1) making public a work created by another person;
and (2) exploiting a copyright owner's work without paying her
according to the provisions of the law. 7 3 Acts considered "serious
infringements" include producing and distributing recordings of
another producer. 74 The penalties imposed for this behavior include
confiscation of illegal income, fines, and civil or criminal liability. 75 A
copyright owner's available remedies for these infringing acts are
76
damages, an injunction, and an apology.
While the creation of the 1990 copyright law was an important
foundational step, it reflected the severe tension that shaped the
drafting process, described as "the 'most complicated' in the PRC's
history" by one high ranking official. 77
The laws "undeniably
reaffirmed the central role of the state in a socialist [system],"
providing "broad exceptions for use by government actors."7 8 The
state was permitted to publish works without permission and without
providing the author any remuneration. 79 Likewise, television and
broadcast stations were given carte blanche to broadcast sound
recordings for non-commercial purposes without compensating or
consulting the author.8 0

71.
INFORMATION OFFICE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
China Has a High-Grade Legal System for Intellectual Property Protection, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CHINA (1994), http://english.people.com.cn/
whitepaper/9(2).html [hereinafter INFORMATION OFFICE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA].

72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Kachuriak, supra note 53, at 607-08.

75.

INFORMATION OFFICE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,

supra note
76.
77.
78.
79.

71.
Id.
Priest, supra note 10, at 808.
Id.
Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China art. 22(7) (promulgated by the

Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991) (P.R.C.),
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/cn/cn0Olen.pdf.

80.

Id. art. 43.
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2. China's Route to the WTO and Compliance with the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
"In July 1986, China applied for admission to the WTO's
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."8'
That same year, efforts began to introduce intellectual property rules
into the multilateral trading system for the first time as the 19861994 Uruguay Round negotiated the TRIPS Agreement, later adopted
82
by the WTO.
The WTO's TRIPS Agreement is an attempt to narrow the gaps in the way
intellectual property rights are protected around the world and to bring them
under common international rules. It establishes minimum levels of protection
that each government must afford to the intellectual property of fellow WTO
83
members.

TRIPS specifically mandates that countries give adequate intellectual
property rights, imposes minimum standards for how those rights
should be enforced domestically, and instructs how disputes between
countries should be settled.8 4 In order to join GATT, and later the
WTO, China needed to upgrade its copyright laws to meet these
requirements.
3. U.S. Trade Sanctions and the MOU
While the Chinese effort at creating a copyright law had gained
some momentum, the effectiveness of the laws were questioned over
time. Once pacified by a desire to lure China into the "family of
nations," U.S. businesses grew increasingly impatient with the
escalating piracy and counterfeiting problems in China.8 5 In 1991,
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Carla Hills identified China as a
"Priority Foreign Country" pursuant to a 1988 statute requiring the
USTR to annually identify countries that deny "adequate and
effective" intellectual property protection and "fair and equitable"
market access to American companies that depend on intellectual

81.
United States Trade Representative, Background Information on China's
Accession to the World Trade Organization (Dec. 11, 2001), http://www.ustr.gov/
DocumentLibrary/Fact Sheets/2001/BackgroundInformation onChina'sAccession to
theWorldTradeOrganization.html.
82.
Id. See also World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, Intellectual
Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 10.
83.
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, Intellectual Property:
Protection and Enforcement, supra note 10.
84.
Id.
85.
Yu, supra note 7, at 8-9.
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property protection.8 6
Hills further instigated a Special 301
investigation of China's intellectual property rights enforcement
practices and policies.8 7 After claims and counterclaims, and threats
of sanctions and countersanctions by both countries, discussions
finally resulted in the signing of the watershed 1992 Memorandum of
88
Understanding on Intellectual Property (MOU).
As required by the terms of the 1992 MOU, China acceded to
the Berne Convention on October 15, 1992, and to the Geneva
Phonograms Convention on October 30, 1992.89 Article 1 of the Berne
Convention created a union of member nations for multilateral
protection of each member state's literary and artistic works. 90
China's copyright law, standing alone, afforded protection to U.S.
works only if they were "first published" in China. 9 1 Significantly,
Article 5 of the Berne Convention extends protection to authors who
92
are not nationals of countries where their works are produced.
Therefore, after China's accession to the Berne Convention, U.S.

86.
Baum, supra note 17, at 55; see also 19 U.S.C. §2242 (a)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).
87.
Office of United States Trade Representative Fact Sheet-Subject: China-United
States Failure To Reach Intellectual Property Accord, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 27, 1991,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Federal News Service file.
88.
US, China Said to be Close to Pact on Intellectual Property Protection, J.
COMMERCE, Oct. 28, 1991, available at LEXIS, News Library, Journal of Commerce file; see
also Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Market Access, U.S.-P.R.C., Oct. 10, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 1274 (1992) [hereinafter MOU].
89.
The relevant terms of the MOU are:
1. The Chinese Government will accede to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) (Paris 1971). The
Chinese Government will submit a bill authorizing accession to the Berne
Convention to its legislative body by April 1, 1992 and will use its best efforts to
have the bill enacted by June 30, 1992. Upon enactment of the authorizing bill,
the Chinese Government's instrument of accession to the Berne Convention will
be.submitted to the World Intellectual Property Organization with accession to
be effective by October 15, 1992.
2. The Chinese Government will accede to the Convention for the Protection of
Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their
Phonograms (Geneva Convention) and submit a bill to its legislative body
authorizing accession by June 30, 1992. The Chinese Government will use its
best efforts to have the bill enacted by February 1, 1993. The Chinese
Government will deposit its instrument of ratification and the Convention will
come into effect by June 1, 1993.
MOU, art. 3, §§ 1-2.
90.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Text)
art. 1, July 24, 1971, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/berne/overview.html [hereinafter Berne Convention].
91.
Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China art. 3 (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991) (P.R.C.),
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs-new/pdf/en/cn/cnO0len.pdf.
92.
Berne Convention, supra note 90, art. 5(1) & (3).
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works produced in China are entitled to the same level of protection as
93
Chinese works.
4. The 1995 China-U.S. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property
Rights
In 1995, China committed itself to improving the enforcement
of its intellectual property laws in a Letter of Agreement with the
United States. 94 The Agreement was China's response to having once
95
more been designated a "Priority Foreign Country" by the USTR.
The key short-term project included the institution of a special
enforcement period during which task forces would conduct raids on
manufacturing and retail facilities, with efforts primarily directed
Factories
against piracy activities involving motion pictures. 96
engaged in infringing activities would have their business licenses
revoked, be punished through seizure and forfeiture of infringing
products, be required to compensate the infringed party's loss, and be
97
subject to serious fines.
Significantly, China also pledged to assist aggrieved foreign
copyright holders in redressing their injuries. 98 Foreign and domestic
right holders could "submit petitions for investigations and
enforcement actions to an enforcement task force." 99 Petitions would
be accepted according to published, uniform criteria limited to
determining whether the petitioner was a right holder (or that
person's authorized representative) and whether the suspicion of
infringement was valid. Foreign right holders were further permitted
to collect by legal means any information relevant to the issue of

93.
See id. A distinction is made between the extent of protection in the country of
origin and the Union: protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law, but
in countries other than the country of origin, the author is given not only the rights which
afforded under that country's domestic laws, but also the rights granted by the Convention.
See id. In theory, therefore, an author can be worse off in the country of origin than in
other countries of the Union. See E.P. SKONE JAMES ET AL., COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON
COPYRIGHT 551-52 (13th ed. Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd. 1991) (1870).
94.
See Letter from Wu Yi, Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of
the People's Republic of China, to Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative (Feb. 26,
1995), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 881, 882 (1995) [hereinafter Wu Yi Letter]; Letter from Wu Yi,
Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of the People's Republic of China, to
Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative, Annex I (Feb. 26, 1995), reprinted in 34 I.L.M.
881, 887 (1995) [hereinafter Wu Yi Annex].
95.
Yu, supra note 7, at 10-11.
96.
Wu Yi Letter, supra note 94, at 883.
Id.
97.
98.
See id.
Wu Yi Annex, supra note 94, at 891.
99.
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infringement. 100
In an effort at prevention, the agreement also
pledged to publicize the intellectual property laws throughout the
country, to offer classes on intellectual property rights at institutes of
higher learning, and to train judicial and prosecutorial personnel to
better deal with infringements. 10 1
On an economic front, the 1995 Agreement also addressed the
rights of foreigners to enter the Chinese market. China confirmed
that it would not "impose quotas, import license requirements, or
other restrictions on the importation of audio-visual and published
products, whether formal or informal."' 1 2 China further agreed to
permit U.S. individuals and entities to establish joint ventures with
Chinese entities in the audio-visual sector. 10 3 These joint ventures
could contract with Chinese publishing enterprises to distribute, sell,
10 4
display and perform works in China.
Addressing the critical issue of enforcement, the 1995
Agreement provided for a long-term (three to five year) plan for
sustained enforcement of China's copyright laws. 10 5 This plan would
be carried out by the "State Council's Working Conference on
Intellectual Property Rights, other working conferences on intellectual
property, enforcement task forces and ad hoc groups," who would
coordinate to provide effective enforcement and punishment of
infringement throughout the country. 0 6
Other administrative
authorities would join this effort, including the National Copyright
Administration, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce,
the Chinese Patent Office, Chinese Customs, and all Chinese police
agencies. 0 7 Thus, a body of enforcement personnel assembled to carry
out the quotidian tasks involved in implementing China's intellectual
08
property laws.
5. The 1996 China-U.S. Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights
Despite the seemingly promising strides made with the 1995
Agreement, China was yet again designated a "Priority Foreign

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 898-99.
Id. at 905-06.
Wu Yi Letter, supra note 94, at 884.
Id.
Id.
Wu Yi Annex, supra note 94, at 887.
Id.
Id. at 890.
See id. at 887.
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The Clinton Administration announced its
Country" in 1996.109
intention to impose approximately $2 billion worth of trade sanctions
on Chinese goods, only to be met thirty minutes later with a
retaliatory announcement by the Chinese threatening similar
sanctions on U.S. goods. 110 The compromise the countries reached
principally affirmed the substance of the 1995 Agreement, rather than
While the utility of the 1996 Agreement
setting out new terms."
thus looked dubious, China made significant progress in combating
piracy after signing it, including the closure of 39 factories pirating
U.S. CDs and the arrest of more than 250 people.1 12 However,113the
event highlighted for some the possible futility of trade sanctions.
6. China Joins the WTO
China finally became a member of the WTO on December 11,
2001.114 It simultaneously shouldered the WTO requirement that its
members operate with openness and transparency, in keeping with
the organization's emphasis on the central role of markets and private
enterprise. 11 5 With regard to copyright protection specifically, China
16
is bound to the TRIPS standards of regulation and enforcement.
Although China's accession to the WTO involved many factors, one
legal scholar has noted that "it would not be too far-fetched to argue
that China might still remain outside the WTO had it not
117
strengthened its protection of intellectual property rights."
Unfortunately, even before China's accession to the WTO,
critics noted that it might not be the panacea that the U.S. was hoping
for and warned that the West might be optimistically exaggerating the
institutional capacity of the WTO to check China's abuse of
Hindsight has demonstrated the
intellectual property rights." 8
wisdom of these predictions: a 2006 USTR report to Congress on

109.
Yu, supra note 7, at 13.
Id.
110.
111.
Id. at 14.
112.
Julia Cheng, Note, China's Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS
Requires an Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1941, 1976-77
(1998).
See id. at 1977-78.
113.
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, Members and Observers,
114.
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tife/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).
United States Trade Representative, supra note 81.
115.
116.
See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, Intellectual Property:
Protection and Enforcement, supra note 10.
117.
Yu, supra note 7, at 30.
Baum, supra note 17, at 63-64.
118.
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China's WTO obligation requirements noted China's lamentable
intellectual property rights enforcement record, even now that China's
five year transition period into the WTO has passed. 19 In particular,
the USTR Report noted that China's enforcement of its laws
protecting the intellectual property rights covered by the TRIPS
agreement has been "ineffective" and that China "continues to deflect
calls from the United States and other WTO members" to combat
infringement despite being placed on the U.S. Priority Watch list in
2005.120 Clearly, China's ability to maintain satisfactory levels of
12 1
copyright enforcement is an ongoing concern.
III. WHY PIRACY IN CHINA IS INCREASING DESPITE LEGISLATIVE
MECHANISMS TO PREVENT IT: THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT

Movie piracy in China should be declining. China drafted its
copyright law in conformity with WTO and international treaty
requirements and, in some areas, such as moral rights protections for
authors, included protections even broader than those provided by the
U.S. Copyright Act. 122
Why then has piracy in China grown
dramatically since the signing of these agreements? Unlike in the
1980's and 1990's, when inadequate laws were to blame, piracy in
China today is on the rise because of deficiencies in the current
enforcement system. 123 The problem manifests itself at various levels
of society-from cultural predispositions held by the public at large, to
an incompetent judiciary and an administrative apparatus captured
by local interests.

119.

UNITED STATES

WTO

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,

2006 REPORT TO

CONGRESS

ON

(2006),
available at
http://ustr.gov/assets/
DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/2006/asset upload-file688_10223.pdf (citing a
"chronic underutilization of deterrent criminal remedies" as a particularly egregious failure
on China's part).
120.
Id. at 6.
121.
See id.
122.
See Jonathan C. Spierer, Intellectual Property in China: Prospectus for New
Market Entrants, HARV. ASIA Q., Summer 1999, available at http://www.asiaquarterly.com/
content/view/44/40/; see also Yonehara, supra note 6, at 395.
123.
Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Prop. Of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statements of Eric H. Smith,
President, International Intellectual Property Alliance).
CHINA'S

COMPLIANCE

70
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A. CulturalDifferences Between the U.S. and China
China's modern cultural predispositions have had a long
gestation period-a history spanning thousands of years in which
successive generations of Chinese have been ingrained with values
often contrary to Western social norms. Cultural differences between
the United States and China account for the different value placed on
U.S. principles of intellectual property law and may seriously impede
the "will" of the Chinese people to protect U.S. intellectual property
rights. 124
1. Tradition of Imitation
"For over 2000 years, the Chinese had been heavily influenced
by Confucianism," a doctrine that reveres the past and deems it the
Therefore,
ultimate tool for understanding future behavior.125
about
the past
and
information
history,
materials
throughout Chinese
were put in the public domain for people to study and pass on to
future generations.' 26 The practice of copying this material as an
Confucius himself proudly
educational tool was encouraged.' 27
acknowledged that he had "transmitted what was taught [him]
128
without making up anything of [his] own."'
Traditional Chinese writers were "compilers rather than
composers"-" [they] memorized vast sequences of the classics and
histories, [and] they constructed their own works by extensive cut'
and-paste replication of phrases and passages from those sources. "129
While the West would classify such works as mere "plagiarism," the
30
Chinese respected them as "preservers" of the historical record.'
Indeed, copying was considered a laudable "manifestation of respect

124.
1995).
125.

126.

Katherine C. Spelman, Combating Counterfeiting, 417 PLI/PAT 309, 326 (Oct.
Yu, supra note 7, at 16-17.

Id. at 17.

127.
Ramona L. Taylor, Tearing Down the Great Wall: China's Road to WTO
Accession, 41 IDEA 151 (2001). See also RAY HUANG, CHINA: A MACRO HISTORY 236 (1997)
(noting that these Chinese civil service exams, which required memorization, were
palatable to the state in historical times as they "subtly delivered materialistic incentives
for the subscription of orthodox social values handed down [from the past] to keep rural
communities in line.").
128.
Yu, supra note 7, at 17 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
JOHN KING FAIRBANK, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY 100-01 (1992).
129.
130.
Id. at 101.
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related to ancestor worship." 131 Intellectual property rights run
contrary to this notion of freely sharing information to better oneself
and society, and therefore contradict traditional Chinese moral
132
standards.
2. Aversion to Litigation
Against this backdrop of a tradition that encourages copying is
a historical disdain for the law and lawsuits. "Rights" in China are
133
typically developed through tradition and custom, rather than law.
Traditionally, Fa (positive law) was considered less important than Li
(moral code or customary law) in Confucian China.13 4 In other words,
"rigid codes and severe punishment" had less utility in regulating
human behavior and society than did "good moral example and
persuasion."1 35 While the imperial Chinese created a code of law, that
code embodied the ethics of Confucius and was "invoked only when
36
moral persuasion and social sanction failed."'
Furthermore, the Chinese traditionally eschewed the courts
and viewed litigation as a "last resort."1 37 "In line with the spirit of
social harmony and compromise [advocated by Confucius], the
informal means of mediation became the prevailing form of dispute
38
resolution" and were held in higher regard than the court system.
Even when the Chinese Nationalist government of the 1930's
established an independent judicial hierarchy, "the tendency was to
disregard Fa in favor of Li" where the two conflicted. 13 9 Thus, the
institution in China of a legal infrastructure in line with Western style

131.

J.

DAVID MURPHY, PLUNDER AND PRESERVATION: CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW

Interestingly, in the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, increased collecting of antique artifacts led to
an increase in forgeries. Id. at 31. "Chinese dealers [of ancient artifacts] used to feel that
if the prospective purchaser could not see the difference [between an original and a copy]
he may as well have a copy." Id. at 31-32 (quoting Anthony du Boulay, Attributions, Fakes,
and Forgeries,in CHRISTIE'S GUIDE To COLLECTING 62 (Robert Cumming, ed. 1984)).
132.
Yu, supra note 7, at 17.
133.
Spelman, supra note 124, at 326.
134.
LENG, supra note 13, at xiii.
135.
Id. In addition, "[tlhis view is well illustrated by one of Confucius' statements:
'If the people are guided by laws and regulated by punishment, they will try to avoid the
punishment but have no sense of shame; if they are guided by virtue and regulated by Li,
they will have the sense of shame and also become good."' Id. (quoting THE ANALECTS,
Book 2, Chapter 3).
136.
Id. at xiv.
137.
Id.
138.
Id. at xv.
139.
Id.
AND PRACTICE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 30 (1995).
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rule of law did not necessarily guarantee a comparable notion of
justice. To this day, the Chinese regard laws as "inefficient, arbitrary
' 140
and cumbersome instrument[s] for government interference."
B. IdeologicalProblems
The PRC's notorious censorship of information has had the
unintended, albeit predictable, effect of creating a booming black
market for illegal versions of censored movies.1 41 Imported films,
portraying (if not idealizing) Western culture and political views are a
natural target of the PRC's information control policy.1 42 The logic
behind such control is that the media can serve as a conduit for
political indoctrination, as well as a vehicle for mobilization of the
masses-both potentially destabilizing elements to the Communist
regime.

143

"The Motion Picture Exhibitors Association of America has
alleged that 'China has an unofficial, unwritten, "shadowy" system of
quotas for films, video, and television."'1 44 Indeed, films "undergo very
stringent
scrutiny
under
China's
information
censorship
regulations." 145 For example, the 1998 film "Red Corner" (depicting a
wealthy American businessman framed for murder by corrupt Chinese
officials while working on a joint venture with the PRC government)
was not even allowed into China because its political theme was
deemed distasteful. 146 Walt Disney was told that its film "Kundun"
(which shows a Chinese invasion of Tibet and has a notable bias in
favor of the latter country) could not come in unless Disney "better
cooperated with China in relevant areas." 14 7 Interestingly, Disney's
"Mulan" (depicting a Chinese girl who dresses as a man and enlists in
the Emperor's army to keep her aging father from being sent to the
front line and certain death) was only distributed after rumors that
Disney was planning on building a Disneyland theme park in
148
Southeast China.
140.
Yu, supra note 7, at 24.
141.
Pang, supra note 15, at 110.
142.
Id. at 119.
143.
See id.
144.
Yu, supra note 7, at 23 (citing Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S.
Intellectual Property Rights in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38
ARIz. L. REV. 1081, 1105-06 (1996)).
145.
Yonehara, supra note 6, at 413.
146.
Id. at 413 & n.203.
147.
Id. at 413.
148.
Id.; see also Wikipedia.org, Mulan, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mulan (last
visited Jan. 17, 2007).
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Unfortunately, while the Chinese government's censorship
policies ignore the public's appetite for entertaining movies, the
14 9
masses turn to the black market for their entertainment demands.
Thus, the result of such tight control is simply "Chinese cinema's
metamorphosis from a collective public event to a piracy-privacy
activity." 150
C. The Judiciary
Inherent flaws in China's nascent judiciary, and public
perception of the system as a whole, seriously undermine this
potentially ideal recourse for redressing and deterring copyright
abuses. The problem is both ideological and practical-China has a
15 1
long history of subordinating law to dominant political philosophy,
notably evidenced when Mao decimated the judiciary in the Cultural
Revolution. 15 2 The court system which has evolved since Mao's death
is still very new and lacks many of the procedural safeguards, such as
transparency and independence from other branches of government,
1 53
which would enable efficient resolution of copyright disputes.
1. Lack of Adequate Legal Personnel
A principle problem with enforcing copyright laws in China
today is the lack of education among legal professionals. In the 1960s,
during the Cultural Revolution in China, judges were considered
enemies of the people and sent to forced labor camps for "reeducation. 154 Lawyers were jailed for defending clients charged with
political subversion, and judges were persecuted for placing law above

149.
Pang, supra note 15, at 110.
150.
Id. at 103; see, e.g., id. at 119 (describing the government's control of the cinema
industry). As early as the 1930's, the Communist Part, as early seized on the cinema as its
major pedagogical tool. Id. at 105. The China Film Corporation was established and
charged with coordinating all film-related units in China, as well as selected foreign
distributors. Id. The power of China Film Corporation was absolute, as it had exclusive
control over film imports, exports, and national distribution. Id. The state has since
shown little enthusiasm for replacing the policy of cinema centralization. Id. at 106.
151.
LENG, supra note 13, at 53 (observing that many existing laws were changed to
reflect changes in the political or economic conditions).
152.
Baum, supra note 17, at 49.
153.
Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China's Judicial Reform, 4
ASIAN-PACIFIc L. & POLY J. 180, 183 (2003); see also Baum, supra note 17, at 63.
154.
See Gregory S. Kolton, Comment, Copyright Law and the People's Courts in the
People's Republic of China: A Review and Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 415, 425 (1996).
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the People's Revolution. 155 At the height of the Cultural Revolution,
the legal system as a distinct entity effectively ceased to exist. 156
China has since rebuilt its legal system, but insufficient time
has elapsed since its atrophy to cultivate individuals with enough
experience to sit on the bench. 157 The fact that Chinese judges are
political appointees who very often have no formal legal training only
exacerbates the problem. 158 For example, in an effort to rapidly
expand the number of judges in China many retired army officers
without legal training were recruited to the bench. 159
This is
particularly problematic in China's inquisitorial judicial system where
judges must determine the facts themselves rather than supervise
adversarial lawyers' presentation of the story.160
With little
knowledge of the law, knowing the relevant questions to ask in a
complex copyright action is clearly a challenge. Indeed, throughout
the 1980's, the People's Court itself complained about lack of training
and experience. 16' The subsequent creation of intellectual property
courts in an effort at compliance with its international treaty
obligations has not been the panacea China claims, and problems of
technical competence persist.162
2. No Familiarity with Copyright Laws
Another problem with the judiciary is the dearth of lawyers
genuinely qualified to practice law in general, let alone handle
complex copyright issues involving new Chinese law. In 1982, there
163
were "fewer than 10,000 lawyers in a country of nearly one billion."
Historically, the requirements for admission to the "people's bar" were
rather irregular and established minimum educational requirements
far below the floor set by the American Bar Association. 164 For
155.

Baum, supra note 17, at 49.

156.
157.

Id.
See id. at 61.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See id.
Id. at 61.
Kolton, supra note 154, at 450.
PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 15 (1997).
Butterton, supra note 144, at 1101.

163.

RONALD

C.

BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND LEGAL PROCESS:

LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 24-25 (1997). Even before the Communist regime
took power, "the Chinese never held the bar in the same esteem as the people in the West."
LENG, supra note 13, at 127.
164.
LENG, supra note 13, at 138; see also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR
EXAMINERS & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 3-16

(2007),

available at http://www.ncbex.org/fileadmin/mediafiles/downloads/CompGuide/
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example, a person who had not "graduated from a senior law school"
or "been trained in a legal professional subject" could apply for
admission to a Lawyer's Association if he possessed "similar ability
and ha[d] graduated from a university." 165 In May 1996, the Lawyer's
Law of the PRC was promulgated to develop a "more professional and
accountable legal community." 166 A subsequent growth spurt saw the
number of lawyers rise to 170,000 by the end of 1997.167 However, the
growth in numbers has not been matched by a concomitant increase in
quality of legal training.168
3. Lack of Independence
The Chinese judiciary traditionally enjoys no more
independence than the bounds imposed by the dominant political
philosophy of the day. "During the Mao era, formal laws were
denounced" as "defective" on a number of grounds, including their
2007CompGuide.pdf (setting standards for character and fitness determinations,
requirements for completion of certain courses and skills training during law school and
registration requirements for lawyers in each U.S. jurisdiction); American Bar Association,
Mandatory
Continuing
Legal
Education
(MCLE),
http://www.abanet.org/cle/
mandatory.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2007) (noting that 43 jurisdictions require lawyers to
undergo continuing legal education in order to practice law in that jurisdiction).
165.
ZHENG CHENGSI, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHONOLOGY
TRANSFER LAW 5 (1987) (quoting articles 8 and 9 of the Interim Rules Concerning
Lawyers).
Under the Lawyers Law, there are two avenues by which a person may qualify
as a lawyer. The first is to pass the national bar examination (NBE). Qualified
candidates include: (a) those who have studied in law faculties of universities
and obtained diplomas at tertiary level (zhuanke) or higher; (b) those who hold
the same level of professional skills as in (a); and (c) those who have received a
Bachelor's degree or above in other university subjects. The second avenue is to
be granted the title of "lawyer" upon assessment and approval (kaohe) by the
judicial administrative department of the State Council. Eligible candidates
include those who have obtained a Bachelor's degree or higher from law faculty
of a university, and are engaged in research or teaching law with senior
professional titles, or who have attained the same level of professional skills....
. . . The Minister of Justice defended this dual system by claiming that
candidates qualified through the kaohe system "are of a higher cultural level and
have engaged in legal professional work for a longer period of time and are of a
higher level of legal proficiency". Many do not view this as a satisfactory
institution of qualification.
Li Yuwen, Lawyers in China: A "Flourishing"Profession in a Rapidly Changing Society?
CHINA PERSP., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 20, available at http://www.cefc.com.hk/uk/pc/articles/
artjligne.php?num.art-ligne=2702 (citations omitted). Note also that the American Bar
Association even requires Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) courses in the
first several years of practice. See American Bar Association, Summary of State MCLE
Requirements, http://www.abanet.org/cle/mcleview.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).
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"rigidity," and were replaced with socialist laws that would "operate
within the boundaries of policy directives."'169 Thereafter, until Mao's
death in 1976, law was simply a vehicle for implementation of his
political policy. 170 Post-Mao leadership relaxed political control of the
law to some degree, but the state of the law still lags far behind
Western norms required by the WTO.171 To this day, no principle,
however normatively stated in the Constitution or law, is permitted to
conflict with the policy needs of the Communist Party. 172 Though the
law generally operates in a predictable manner, it is still considered a
"concrete formulation of the Party's policy" and is intended to be
173
flexible.
4. Lack of Transparency
Transparency of the legal process, while a fundamental
underpinning of the U.S. legal system, is sorely lacking in China and
poses another obstacle to redressing copyright abuses in China
through resort to the judiciary. 74 Despite the TRIPS Agreement
requirement that law, regulations and final judicial decisions of
general application "pertaining to [intellectual property rights]
infringement be made publicly available to rights holders," the USTR
reported in 2005 that China is acutely lagging behind its treaty
obligations. 175 "[L]ack of transparent information on [intellectual
property rights] infringement levels and enforcement activities in
China continues to be an acute problem."' 76 Government entities
responsible for drafting rules only solicit comments from pre-selected
industry and trade associations rather than the public at large,
despite numerous pledges to the United States that they would
consult the general population. 177 Moreover, certain laws are not
available to the public even when enacted, and "numerous local rules

169.
Yu, supra note 7, at 25 (citing FENG, supra note 161, at 10) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

170.

Id.

Lin, supra note 153, at 214-15.
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See Yu, supra note 7, at 25.
173.
Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudiceand Perspectives:An Attempt to Use Shakespeare
to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L. J. 1, 35-36
(2001) (quoting FENG, supra note 161, at 3).
174.
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are inconsistent with national law... resulting in uncertainty and
178
confusion.'
...

5. Low Damage Awards
While many institutional problems clearly frustrate foreigners'
litigation of intellectual property claims in China, the unavailability of
sufficient damage awards discourages would-be litigants from even
bringing suit in the first place. "[D]amages [for counterfeit and
pirated goods] are often assessed based on the infringer's profits,"
rather than the loss by the petitioner of the actual retail value of the
copied film. 1 79 Inevitably, the pirated goods are sold at a price much
lower than the retail value of the original, and the paltry damage
'80
award therefore "frequently does not justify the cost of litigation."'
The addition of statutory damage provisions to China's recently
revised intellectual property laws are a step in the right direction.
Changes in the intellectual property laws now permit "awards up to
RMB500,000 (US$62,000) in trademark and copyright infringement
cases where the right holder's actual losses or the infringer's profits
are difficult to prove."''
However, even with these revisions, it is
difficult to enforce the judgments issued by Chinese courts in many
cases.18 2 Over half of civil and economic judgments in China require
coercive enforcement procedures to be implemented. 8 3 The winning
party often spends extra time, effort and money to enforce judgments
with no guarantee of any compensation at all.18 4 Indeed, enforcement

178.

Id.

179.

AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 18.
Id.
Id. "Such difficulties in proving prior profits or damages are the norm

180.

181.
...
in
most counterfeiting and copyright piracy cases"-particularly since there is no formal

discovery mechanism in China. Id. In fact, Chinese parties "can easily conceal, distort, or
even destroy evidence before or during trial, because parties typically are not required to
produce relevant materials upon request," nor are they subject to criminal sanctions for
such behavior. Id. To remedy this problem, the Civil Procedure Code and Evidence law
must be amended. Id.
182.
See Donald C. Clarke, The Execution of Civil Judgments in China, CHINA Q.
(SPECIAL ISSUE), Mar. 1995, at 65.

183.
Posting of Donald Clark to Chinese Law Professor Blog, Wan Exiang: Over Half
of
Civil
and
Economic
Judgments
Require
Coercive
Enforcement,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china law-prof-blog/2005/07/wan-exiang-over.html (July
8, 2005).
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continues to be described by many as "harder than reaching the
85
sky.",
D. Administrative
Beijing's agreements with the United States are of little import
if they are not enforced at the local level. The problem of local
protectionism has been touted by one legal scholar as "the single most
significant problem for those seeking [to enforce] their rights" in
China. 8 6 In 1979, the Chinese government "decentralize[d] power
from the federal government to local and provincial governments as a
means of facilitating the country's transition from a planned to a
market economy."'18 7 Today, "[1]ocal governments play an increasingly
active role in politics," and "it is often hard to implement a national
' 88
plan without local governments' consent and cooperation."'
Moreover, individuals seeking redress confront a maze of individual
89
governments, each with its own interests in mind.
Local protectionism poses a major obstacle in combating movie
piracy since provincial governments have the task of enforcing the
copyright laws at the local level. 190 In making political judgments,
local interests often trump the exigencies of state policy. 19 1 Local
officials are tempted to "intervene in court judgments that would
seriously jeopardize local business enterprises" in order to avoid
potential political and economic fallout. 92 "The trade in counterfeit
goods has become a 'vital portion of some local economies, providing
employment of otherwise unemployable workers and generating
significant revenue for the local economy."'193
Because the
administrative enforcement offices have limited budgets, they are
often no match for the wealthy and fiscally independent, "politically
powerful local government[s]." 194 Furthermore, enforcement officials
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See Enforcement of Civil Judgments: Harder Than Reaching the Sky, CHINA L.
& Gov. REV., June 2004, http://www.chinareview.info/issue2/pages/legal.htm.
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are generally not neutral to begin with, "since local government
directly controls the recruiting, financing and management of the
195
region's enforcement authority."
IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES TO CURB MOVIE PIRACY IN CHINA
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States "relied
heavily on pressure and ultimata" to force the Chinese to create and
reform their copyright laws. 196 However, the Chinese have been most
vigilant about intellectual property protection when the U.S.
government and American businesses backed away from these
coercive tactics. 197 What accounts for this seemingly counterintuitive
result? First, American threats of trade sanctions do more harm than
good: they hinder the relationship between the United States and
China, and they "defeat the cooperative style of the WTO. '1 98 By
virtue of its membership in the WTO, China is already obligated to
abide by its rules, including TRIPS.1 99 China's interest in continued
membership is a more effective incentive to curb piracy than the
threat of trade sanctions. 20 0 Furthermore, "[r]epetitive threats of
trade sanctions might cause China to lose patience with the United
States and switch to Europe, Japan and Russia" for its trade. 20 1 Not
only would the current profitable level of trade between the United
States and China thus be lost, but the international criticism the
United States has already suffered for its continued use of unilateral
trade sanctions would increase. 20 2 Fortunately, while trade sanctions
fall short of effectively curbing Chinese piracy, more benign measures
may prove effective. 20 3 Skeptics argue that pressure tactics only result
in short-term, well-publicized raids of factories, while fundamental
20 4
changes will affect these same results without foreign coercion.
Below, I propose that instituting a combination of educational
initiatives, judicial reform and economic incentives is a workable and
effective strategy to tackle the problem of movie piracy in China.
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A. Education
In order to enforce China's existing set of intellectual property
right laws, it is critical to educate both legal professionals and the
public about their existence, how to use them, and the ills they seek to
prevent. The 1995 Action Plan called for an education campaign
which has, at least recently, gained momentum. In May 2004, the
Shanghai Municipal People's Government and Shanghai Intellectual
Property Administration signed a seven-year agreement with the
American International Education Foundation (AIEF) to strengthen
the city's intellectual property rights standards. 2 5 The AIEF will
facilitate intellectual property rights reform in China's largest city by
providing integrated education and training programs to "Shanghai
policy makers, administrators, educators, judges, customs officers,
business owners and enforcement agents."20 6 "China already has
established intellectual property departments at several top
universities"; both Beijing University and Shanghai University opened
20 7
intellectual property departments over a decade ago.
Educating the lay public is equally important since these are
obviously the main culprits for the current piracy problem-both in
terms of creating and buying pirated movies. The State Intellectual
Property Office (SIPO) released a report on January 16, 2006
highlighting experimental intellectual property rights education
initiatives to "accelerate social development," such as teaching
children about intellectual property rights and that infringement is
wrong, as well as "encourage[ing adults] to be creative." 20 8 The report
noted that many of the other government-instituted projects thus far
have only been temporary solutions. 20 9 According to SIPO, a "final,
comprehensive approach would be for China to include [intellectual
210
property rights] education in its national development strategies."
It is clear that China has much work to do before it reaches the
level of education needed to effectively curb piracy. Piracy is so
commonplace in China that it does not strike the public consciousness;

American International Education Foundation, Shanghai IPR Workshop 2004,
205.
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Industrial Center, http://www.ief-usa.org/ipr/workshop/shanghai2004.htm (last visited
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pirated DVDs are sold not only on street corners by individual
211
vendors, but in fixed stores brazenly displaying their illegal wares.
In the same way that the U.S. public did not believe smoking to be
unhealthy until aggressive educational and advertising campaigns
assaulted the nation with images of black lungs and mute patients in
hospital beds, the Chinese public should be educated about how film
piracy can wreck the careers of individual artists and cripple the
movie industry as a whole. Educational campaigns should target
youth in elementary and middle schools, so that children learn early
that buying a pirated DVD is the same as stealing a physical object
from a store, and that the seriousness of the offense in the eyes of the
law is no less severe.
B. JudicialReform
China must remedy the poor state of its judiciary if civil
litigation is ever to effectively deter copyright infringement. In its
2005 report, the USTR noted that a lack of transparency in the
2 12 It
Chinese intellectual property law remains an "acute problem."
proposed that China immediately "[m]ake publicly available case
rulings and [intellectual property rights]-related statistical data,
including data on government compliance with software copyright
licensing, and on administrative and judicial decisions, including
213
penalties imposed."
As far as penalties are concerned, it is imperative that China's
recent progress in increasing damage awards for civil lawsuits be
maintained, if not augmented. In September 2003, "the Beijing-based
New Oriental Education Group, China's leading private English
language school, was ordered by a local court to pay 10 million yuan
(1.2 million US dollars) in compensation to two US plaintiffs for
copyright and trademark infringements." 214 In October 2003, the
China Music Copyright Society sued a Chinese mobile phone
manufacturer, claiming 12.8 million yuan ($1.55 million) in damages
for the unauthorized use of copyrighted music. 21 5 The Copyright
211.
William Lash, Assistant Sec'y of Commerce for Mkt. Access and Compliance,
Press Conference at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing (Apr. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/press/release/2005/0414051as.htm).
212.
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Society noted that it wanted to use its case "as a warning to other
companies that [it is] serious about protecting intellectual property
rights."216 With the increase in civil suits, Chinese businesses worry
that a multi-million dollar intellectual property rights war is
looming. 217 A noted Beijing expert on intellectual property law has
commented, "[a]s an imminent [intellectual property rights] and
patent war is looming large, domestic companies should learn to do
business in the long term ....

You make some money by infringing

upon others' copyrights and patents in the short term, but sooner or
later you will pay dearly for it."218 This is precisely the desired result
of high damage awards, and efforts to maintain, if not increase, them
should be pursued vigorously by the U.S. government and movie
industry.
C. Implement Economic Incentives
An indispensable element in the effort to improve China's
enforcement of its copyright laws is its own economic self-interest.
The 1995 Agreement Letter proposed joint ventures as a means of
facilitating market access for U.S. companies doing business in China,
and the Chinese committed to promoting these joint ventures in the
1996 follow-up Agreement. 2 19 Participants in equity and contractual
joint ventures share risks and losses as well as profits. 220 With the
Chinese as "stakeholders," intellectual property rights, and the
curbing of their abuse by extension, will gain new importance, and
221
Chinese interests will align with those of the U.S. movie industry.
Joint ventures are also a powerful tool against local
protectionism. 222 A Chinese party to a joint venture will understand
the "nuances of political life in China" better than its U.S. counterpart
and can maintain the proper government contacts to safeguard the
Local governments will naturally
joint venture's investment. 223

Hong Kong), Dec. 2003, at 3-4, available at http://www.sfks.com.hk/English/ip/2003/eIP05200312.pdf.
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respond more favorably to requests for assistance from a semi-Chinese
224
supplicant than from a total outsider.
A similar practice is that of 'partnering' with local Chinese
' 225
trade associations, local government, and industry representatives.
"Partnering" means: "establishing an active relationship or alliance
• . . to obtain a stated or common goal." 226 The Software Publishing
Association touts "partnering" as the best method of "assuring cultural
acceptance of the anti-piracy message" and of reducing the "ugly
American image which may otherwise hinder local market
penetration." 227 This is also an effective means of pooling resources to
detect, investigate and prosecute local acts of piracy. 228
Thus,
partnering not only bolsters grass-roots efforts to deter piracy but
additionally tackles the more intangible obstacles of cultural
differences and suspicions by promoting "normalized relations with
the Chinese." 229 In the future, U.S. companies should continue to
partner with Chinese companies and enter into joint ventures, rather
than forging into the marketplace alone.
As China's free market evolves, the effects of piracy are no
longer merely hurting foreigners or a select group of wealthy Chinese
businessmen, but the population at large.
The free trade in
counterfeit goods encourages many customers to purchase them "at
cheap prices with the intention of getting refunds from distributors of
licensed goods for full value." 230 Thus, legitimate Chinese businesses
are the ultimate victims, making it difficult to build national brands
or invest in research and development. 231 Additionally, the saturation
of the market with fake goods, often indistinguishable from genuine
goods, creates a disincentive for Chinese companies to create new
products. This in turn reduces China's ability to develop its own
industries and cuts its chances of emerging as a prestigious player in
the global marketplace. 232 In addition, counterfeit goods result in
billions of losses in tax revenue for the nation each year and China's
poor copyright enforcement record deters some foreign investors from
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entering the Chinese market. 233 The United States should capitalize
on these negative effects of piracy and highlight them in their
education campaigns. By communicating to the Chinese that piracy is
not just a question of robbing a distant foreign company, but a
pervasive problem with real consequences at home, the incentive to
combat piracy will increase dramatically.
Economic incentives are also an important way to deal with the
problems inherent in the above proposed solutions of educational and
judicial reform. Education is an effective tool in combating piracy but
obviously entails a large commitment of capital and resources on the
part of the Chinese: housing and staffing classes for lawyers, judges
and lay people in a country as large as China is no small undertaking.
Likewise, judicial reform will entail much work and expense if the
Chinese are to create the clear system of judicial case reporting called
for by the USTR. 234 However, shouldering such responsibilities will
clearly be far less unpleasant if the Chinese themselves can benefit
from these endeavors.
The key is to implement all three solutions at once. The
Chinese may see little reason to enter into joint ventures if they
predict piracy will eat away at their profits, and this complacency will
only create a more permissive environment in which piracy will
flourish. However, if the Chinese commit to proactively combat piracy
through education and judicial reform, and also enter into joint
ventures, they will earn profits sufficient to sustain the battle against
piracy and create a society-wide recognition of the benefits to be
earned from doing so. Their success will enable further ventures and
greater profit maximization, which in turn will create more resources
and vigilance to continually combat the problem of piracy.
V. CONCLUSION

In just two and a half decades, China has made enormous
progress in copyright protection, yet movie piracy in China is more
rampant than ever. Early U.S. efforts to curb the piracy problem were
233.
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coercive in nature and, to some degree, effective. In just twenty years,
China created a body of intellectual property law that met
international standards and facilitated China's accession to the WTO.
On the other hand, the ultimate U.S. objective of eliminating piracy
was not satisfied. Today, a new approach is needed.
A critical element in combating movie piracy is not only
implementing a body of laws to deter people from stealing and
distributing foreign films, but actually enforcing those laws
stringently. Several facets of Chinese society make enforcement of
copyright laws even more difficult than their implementation. The
Chinese have an ingrained tradition of emulating works; copying is
glorified rather than condemned. In addition, they have a deep-rooted
aversion to litigation and to the rule of positive law. In order to
maintain its ideological tenets, the PRC resorts to a strict information
control policy that prohibits many foreign films from entering the
country legally, creating a healthy black market for these goods. The
Chinese judiciary is making a strong recovery from its near nonexistence in the 1970s, but it is still not comparable to Western legal
systems, nor yet capable of establishing a similar rule of law. The fact
that the enforcement of copyright law has fallen captive to local
interests that often conflict with the law's deterrent and punitive
purposes further aggravates the problem.
If the rate of movie piracy in China is ever to be reduced, the
United States must recognize that the above-mentioned factors are
not easily countered with coercive measures, such as trade sanctions.
Rather, the key is to work cooperatively with the Chinese and educate
them on the ways copyright enforcement serves their own interests.
The United States needs to enter into joint ventures with the Chinese
so that the later become stakeholders and have an economic incentive
to curb piracy.
Both the U.S. government and private U.S.
organizations, such as the MPAA, need to "partner" with the Chinese
to combat the effects of local protectionism and secure allies in-efforts
to raid local factories churning out illegal discs. The United States
should also educate the Chinese so that the legitimate business
owners who are losing money because of counterfeiting can actually
take advantage of the protections the law provides. Education must
be provided to those judges and lawyers who are still grappling with
the complex set of copyright laws. In addition, the Chinese judiciary
needs to continue to give high damage awards in copyright
infringement cases, sending a message across the country that piracy
does not pay. Some progress is already underway, but the U.S. and
Chinese governments, as well as private organizations, need to make
much more headway into Chinese society to resolve this problem at
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the ground level. Handing out merit badges to boy scouts is just the
beginning.
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